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DON’T PRESS SEND: COMMONWEALTH V. DIEGO TAKES
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY AWAY FROM TEXTERS
MARC B. ROBERTSON*
“[W]e as human beings, even those of us who in words disclaim the
importance of our own privacy, instinctively understand the profound
importance of it.”1
I.

YOU HAVE ONE NEW MESSAGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PENNSYLVANIA SUPERIOR COURT’S MESSAGE THAT TEXTS ARE
NOT PRIVATE

As presidential candidates Rand Paul and Chris Christie stood on the
debate stage, they sparred over one of the most pressing and contentious matters
facing the United States today: the government’s invasion of individuals’
privacy rights.2 Christie, a former United States Attorney and strong supporter
of law enforcement, argued for continuing the use of mass surveillance in an
effort to prevent terrorist attacks. 3 Paul, a libertarian and staunch opponent of
government surveillance, provided a familiar retort to each of Christie’s
comments: “Get a warrant!”4 The issue these two men were debating was
whether the warnings from George Orwell’s dystopian commentary 1984 were
coming true: “There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being
watched at any given moment. . . . You had to live—did live, from habit that
became instinct—in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard,
and, except in darkness, every movement scrutinized.” 5
*
J.D. Candidate, 2017, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law; B.A.
2012, Villanova University. I would like to thank my family and friends who continue to
support me throughout all my endeavors. I am especially grateful to those who provided
feedback and input in writing this Note. I would also like to thank the Villanova Law Review
and everyone whose work went into publication of this Note.
1. Glenn Greenwald, Why Privacy Matters, TED TALKS (Oct. 7, 2014), transcript
available
at
www.ted.com/talks/glenn_greenwald_why_privacy_matters/transcript?language=en
[https://perma.cc/UY3W-F5FM] (discussing concerns over privacy issues in wake of Edward
Snowden revealing details about government’s mass surveillance programs).
2. See Transcript: Read the Full Text of the Primetime Republican Debate, TIME (Aug.
6,
2015),
http://time.com/3988276/republican-debate-primetime-transcript-full-text/
[https://perma.cc/DV85-YNS5] (updated Aug. 11, 2015, 4:30 PM) (responding to question
regarding government surveillance).
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 3 (1st Signet Classic reprt. 1961) (1949). See
generally, Greenwald, supra note 1 (referencing George Orwell’s discussion of surveillance
activities of Big Brother in novel 1984). In his recent TED Talk, Mr. Greenwald addresses
the issue of privacy in the wake of revelations by Edward Snowden that the American
government was involved in “indiscriminate surveillance.” See id. Early in the lecture, he
addresses the argument made by many in support of this surveillance that “no real harm []
comes from this large-scale invasion because only people who are engaged in bad acts have a
reason to want to hide and to care about their privacy.” See id. Greenwald, however, rebukes

(11)
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While terrorist attacks and mass indiscriminate surveillance are more
extreme circumstances than those at issue in Commonwealth v. Diego,6 the
superior court decision could have far-reaching and potentially grave
ramifications on privacy in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 7 In Diego,
Curtis Doval Diego set up a drug transaction via text message with a police
informant.8 After his arrest, Diego argued he had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the text messages sent to the informant and that the police violated
the Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act (the Pennsylvania
Wiretap Act) by “intercept[ing]” his text messages without first obtaining a
warrant.9 Upon review of the trial court decision to suppress the evidence, the
superior court found Diego lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
text messages he sent.10 Because of this, there was no “interception” of those
messages as the informant voluntarily turned them over to law enforcement. 11
This Note argues that Pennsylvania courts ought to recognize a reasonable
expectation of privacy in text messages. 12 Further, the Pennsylvania legislature
should amend the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act to address the Pennsylvania
Superior Court’s decision in Diego and require law enforcement to obtain a
warrant before obtaining an individual’s text messages, even if the recipient of
those messages relays them to the police.13 Part II provides a background of
privacy issues in the United States.14 Next, Part III sets out the facts and
procedure of Diego.15 Part IV then analyzes the superior court’s reasoning. 16
this notion, stating that although there are people who claim to not care about privacy, no one
truly feels this way. See id. He says that all human beings “instinctively understand the
profound importance of [privacy].” Id. Greenwald believes that all humans “crave[]” privacy
and notes that many psychological studies have found that when people believe they are being
watched, they change their behavior “dramatically.” See id. He notes that government access
to items humans believe should be private harms society as a whole. See id. This issue is
extremely important to humans because,
[I]t is a realm of privacy, the ability to go somewhere where we can think and
reason and interact and speak without the judgmental eyes of others being cast upon
us, in which creativity and exploration and dissent exclusively reside, and that is the
reason why, when we allow a society to exist in which we’re subject to constant
monitoring, we allow the essence of human freedom to be severely crippled.
Id.
6. 119 A.3d 370 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015), appeal denied, 129 A.3d 1240 (Pa. 2015)
(mem.) (unpublished table decision).
7. For a thorough discussion of the impact of the Diego decision, see infra notes 126–
58 and accompanying text.
8. See Diego, 119 A.3d at 372–73 (discussing police use of informant to set up drug
transaction).
9. See id.
10. See id. at 372 (reversing suppression order).
11. See id. at 382 (holding that trial court decision should be overturned).
12. For a further discussion of the need for courts to find a reasonable expectation of
privacy in text messages, see infra notes 133–47 and accompanying text.
13. See Diego at 380–81 (finding no interception occurs in violation of Pennsylvania
Wiretap Act when informant “voluntarily” relays text messages to law enforcement officer).
14. For a further discussion of privacy issues, see infra notes 18–78 and accompanying
text.
15. For a further discussion of the facts, procedural history, and holding in Diego, see
infra notes 79–125 and accompanying text.
16. For a further discussion of the need for a broader expectation of privacy and
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Part V concludes by arguing for a broader expectation of privacy in sent text
messages and asserting the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act should be amended to
close the loophole that allows law enforcement officers to obtain text messages
from an informant without obtaining a warrant. 17
II.

FROM PAGERS TO FLIP PHONES TO SMART PHONES: A
BACKGROUND OF LEGAL DECISIONS REGARDING PRIVACY IN
TECHNOLOGY

As technological developments have led to new and different varieties of
communication, courts have been faced with the issue of deciding what is
private and what is not.18 These cases typically involve the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and address the issue of whether law
enforcement must obtain a warrant before searching one’s property. 19 As
technology has advanced, state surveillance statutes such as the Pennsylvania
Wiretap Act have come under review, and courts have had to balance privacy
issues against the ability of law enforcement to fight crime. 20 While the law is
legislation to protect that privacy, see infra notes 126–58 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of how Diego may affect privacy rights in the future, see infra
notes 159–63 and accompanying text.
18. See City of Ontario, v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010) (“The judiciary risks error
by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology
before its role in society has become clear.”); see also Joseph C. Vitale, Note, Text Me
Maybe?: State v. Hinton and the Possibility of Fourth Amendment Protections over Sent Text
Messages Stored in Another’s Cell Phone, 58 ST. LOUIS L.J. 1109, 1110 (2014) (explaining
that recent Supreme Court decisions on this issue have given broad deference to lower courts
to decide cell phone privacy issues). For a detailed account of the development of cell phones
and text messaging technology, see Vitale, supra, at 1112–18 (detailing cell phone use around
world). Vitale notes that cell phones are “one of the most rapidly growing new technologies
in the world.” Id. at 1112 (quoting Mikiyasu Hakoama & Shotaro Hakoyama, The Impact of
Cell Phone Use on Social Networking and Development Among College Students, 15 AM.
ASS’N BEHAV. & SOC. SCI. J., Spring 2011, at 1, 2) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Because cell phones are widely used, people have grown attached to their cell phones. See id.
at 1113–14. Due to this attachment, studies have found that most people consider the
information stored on their cell phones to be private. See id. Vitale also provides several
interesting statistics regarding cell phone privacy, including,
[s]eventy-eight percent of Americans consider the information on their cell phones
to be “at least as private as that on their home computers.” Furthermore, nearly
20% of Americans think their cell phones hold more private information than do
their computers. Seventy-six percent of Americans think that law enforcement
officers should need permission from a court before searching the cell phone of “a
person arrested on suspicion of committing a crime, if the person does not consent
to having the phone searched.”
Id. at 1114 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Jennifer M. Urban, Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Su Li,
Mobile Phones and Privacy 2 (UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 2103405, 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2103405)). Vitale further discusses the history of text
messages and writes that today, text messaging (in addition to taking photos) is the most
commonly used function of cell phone owners. See id. at 1116–17. These statistics indicate
that courts will need to address the issue of privacy in text messaging, as it is now so
widespread. See id. 1112–18.
19. For a discussion of the Fourth Amendment and the use of warrants, see infra notes
23–28 and accompanying text.
20. For a thorough discussion of the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act, see infra notes 29–37
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unsettled regarding an expectation of privacy when sending a text message, a
growing trend signals greater privacy rights in the future. 21 The Pennsylvania
legislature must recognize these privacy rights and will need to address
loopholes like those in the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act, which allow police
officers to access text messages relayed by informants without obtaining a
warrant.22
A. Passcode Required: The Fourth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s
View of a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
In order to search and seize an object or document, law enforcement must
abide by the Fourth Amendment, which typically involves obtaining a
warrant.23 There are situations, however, where a warrantless search may be

and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Quon, 560 U.S. at 760 (discussing pervasiveness of cell phones). The
Court in Quon considered that because cell phones and text messages were so widely used,
this may “strengthen the case for an expectation of privacy.” See id. While the Court
considered that Quon may have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his text messages,
because the City owned the device, and because of the “‘special needs’ of the workplace,” it
was appropriate for the police department to require access to the messages in certain
situations. See id. at 760–61; see also State v. Hinton, 319 P.3d 9, 15 (Wash. 2014) (en banc)
(holding that individual who shares information with another party does not lose expectation
of privacy); John Soma, Melodi Mosley Gates & Michael Smith, Bit-Wise but Privacy
Foolish: Smarter E-Messaging Technologies Call for a Return to Core Privacy Principles, 20
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 487, 503–04 (2010) (discussing society’s views on e-messaging
technologies and privacy interests). In discussing trends in technology and privacy, the
authors argue that users
base[] [their] expectation of privacy on how [they] use[] the technology, such as to
carry on a conversation, rather than on the specific technical means used. This
functional view by users lends credence to the idea that society should—and likely
will—recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy for e-messaging.
Id. at 504.
22. See Soma et al., supra note 21, at 518 (“Uncertainty in the law leaves e-messaging
users . . . without clear guidance . . . .”). Soma, Gates, and Smith note that courts have shown
willingness to “a privacy principle-based approach . . . regarding text messages,” but the law
regarding this privacy is very unclear. See id. at 517–18; see also Lathrop B. Nelson, III,
Don’t Text with an Informant and iPads Are Not Phones, WHITE COLLAR ALERT (June 25,
2015), http://whitecollarblog.mmwr.com/tag/commonwealth-v-diego/
[https://perma.cc/U5K5-CYZU] (reviewing Pennsylvania Superior Court decision in Diego).
Nelson argues that Diego will force citizens to be “vigilant” to avoid government
overreaching, rather than requiring the government to uphold its constitutional obligations.
See id.
23. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Id.; see also Vitale, supra note 18, at 1118–19 & n.60 (discussing search and seizure
requirements under Fourth Amendment). In analyzing cell phone privacy, many courts
analogize cell phones to “wallets, address books, and diaries.” See id. at 1122. Because cell
phones have address books, and because police are “entitled to open a pocket diary to copy
the owner’s address,” some courts have found that police should be entitled to “turn on a cell
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reasonable.24 If a government official or law enforcement officer violates the
Fourth Amendment and performs an illegal search and seizure, the defendant
can, under certain circumstances, have that evidence suppressed.25 In
addressing whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in text
messages, many courts have looked to the Supreme Court’s decision in Katz v.
United States.26 In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan laid out a test for
determining whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy,
which has been frequently invoked in subsequent court decisions. 27 Justice
Harlan’s two part test requires “first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” 28

phone to learn its number.” See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). However, courts have
begun to recognize a distinction between a cell phone number and the “highly private”
information that can be found on a modern cell phone. See id.
24. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5704(2)(ii) (2015) (noting exception to warrant
requirement of Pennsylvania Wiretap Act when one party gives consent prior to interception);
see also Vitale, supra note 18, at 1118-19 (discussing that there are “various exceptions” to
warrant requirement of Fourth Amendment).
25. See Vitale, supra note 18, at 1118–19 (discussing exclusionary rule). Not only is
illegally-obtained evidence suppressed in such situations, any evidence that was “[the]
exploitation of that illegality” is also suppressed. Id. at 1119 n.65 (alteration in original)
(quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (discussing “fruit of the
poisonous tree” doctrine)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
27. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (introducing test for reasonable expectation
of privacy).
28. See id. (creating test for reasonable expectation of privacy). It is important to note
that there are some exceptions to the Katz test. These include what a person knowingly
exposes to the public, the “misplaced trust doctrine,” when a person sends a letter, and exigent
circumstances. See Vitale, supra, note 18, at 1120 (discussing exceptions to Katz test
whereby one has no reasonable expectation of privacy). Under the misplaced trust doctrine,
“people place their trust in others at their own peril and must assume the risk of [that]
betrayal.” Id. at 1120 (alteration in original) (quoting DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M.
SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY, INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY 82, 107 (3d ed. 2011)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Further, when a person knowingly exposes information to the
public, that information is not protected by the Fourth Amendment. See id. Among the
examples of public disclosure that forecloses Fourth Amendment protection, courts have
decided that when a person sends a letter, there is no expectation of privacy in the contents
once the intended party receives it. See id. at 1140–41 (discussing letter doctrine). Finally, in
exigent circumstances, warrantless searches may be lawful if the need for law enforcement is
greater than the privacy interests. See id. at 1120–21. These include “life-threatening
exigencies, hot pursuit, and preservation of evidence from destruction.” Id. at 1121 (quoting
Clifford S. Fishman, Interception of Communications in Exigent Circumstances: The Fourth
Amendment, Federal Legislation, and the United States Department of Justice, 22 GA. L.
REV. 1, 13 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Often, courts have allowed for
warrantless searches of cell phones in an effort to preserve evidence. See id. at 1121–22.
However, some courts—notably the Ohio Supreme Court—have rejected this rationale,
claiming that service providers may maintain cell phone records and law enforcement may be
able to obtain a warrant to search those records. See id.
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B. Mark as Read: Overview of Pennsylvania’s Wiretapping and
Electronic Surveillance Control Act

The Pennsylvania Wiretap Act is a state statute that seeks to protect
citizens from illegal wiretaps that violate the Fourth Amendment. 29 While
states have the freedom to adopt their own legislation, they must do so in
accordance with federal law and provide at least the same amount of protection
as the federal law.30 Under the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act, it is illegal to
intentionally “intercept[] . . . disclose[] . . . or . . . use[] the contents of any wire,
electronic or oral communication . . . .”31 Pennsylvania courts have consistently
held that the purpose of the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act is to ensure the
protection of privacy, and therefore courts have strictly construed the provisions
of the Act.32
Generally, a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy during an oral
conversation, but there has been disagreement over whether one has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in other forms of communication, such as
emails.33 Another source of confusion often occurs when courts attempt to

29. See 18 PA. CONST. STAT. §§ 5701–5782 (1978); see also Commonwealth v. Deck,
954 A.2d 603, 607–10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) (discussing purpose of Pennsylvania Wiretap
Act). In reviewing the statute, the court instructed, “[The Pennsylvania] Wiretap Act is
modeled on Title III (‘Title III’) of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968”
which “authorizes states to adopt wiretap statutes that trigger greater, but not lesser, protection
than that available under federal law.” Id. at 607. Further, the court instructed that the
provisions of the statute must be “construed strictly” in an effort to protect privacy interests.
See id.
30. See Commonwealth v. Birdseye, 670 A.2d 1124, 1126 (Pa. 1996) (“By virtue of the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, Article VI, Section 2, the Federal Act
preempts the ability of the states to adopt legislation that would be less restrictive in allowing
interceptions.”), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1019 (1996).
31. See 18 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 5703; cf. Wiretap Act, LAWYERS.COM,
http://communications-media.lawyers.com/privacy-law/wiretapping.html
[https://perma.cc/EL3J-N67M] (last visited Mar. 28, 2016) (providing detailed summary and
legal consequences of federal Wiretap Act).
32. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Spangler, 809 A.2d 234, 237 (Pa. 2002) (citing
Commonwealth v. De Marco, 578 A.2d 942, 949 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)) (discussing hesitation
to broaden exceptions found under Pennsylvania Wiretap Act). In addressing the issue before
it, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied on other cases in ensuring that the Pennsylvania
Wiretap Act emphasizes the protection of privacy. See id.
33. See Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823, 829 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001)
(discussing expectation of privacy on internet), appeal granted in part by 790 A.2d 988 (Pa.
2002) (mem.), and order aff’d by 837 A.2d 1163 (Pa. 2003) (mem.). The court said,
While engaging in a conversation over the telephone, a party would have no reason
to believe that the other party was taping the conversation. Any reasonably
intelligent person, savvy enough to be using the Internet, however, would be aware
of the fact that messages are received in a recorded format, by their very nature, and
can be downloaded or printed by the party receiving the message. By the very act
of sending a communication over the Internet, the party expressly consents to the
recording of the message.
Id. In further discussing this issue, the Proetto court held that conversations on the Internet,
similar to messages left on an answering machine, indicate mutual consent of the parties to
recording. See id. at 830 (citing Commonwealth v. De Marco, 578 A.2d 942 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1990); see also Judge Jessica Brewbaker, What are Pennsylvania’s wiretapping laws? The
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determine whether a possible interception falls under the various exceptions
noted in the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act.34 For example, exceptions to the
general requirement to obtain a warrant include when a police officer interacts
directly with a suspected criminal or if one party to the conversation consents to
an interception.35 An even greater source of confusion arises when a police
officer is not directly involved in the conversation. 36 Pennsylvania courts must
resolve the confusion stemming from the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act by
balancing law enforcement and privacy interests. 37
C. Storage Almost Full: Courts Slow to Find Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy in Text Messages
In reviewing the Fourth Amendment regarding technology, courts have
historically been reluctant to find a blanket right to privacy in information. 38
Often, the government will rely on the “misplaced trust” exception to the Katz
test to argue that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the

Judicial Notice with Judge Jessica Brewbaker, PENNLIVE,
http://www.pennlive.com/living/index.ssf/2013/06/the_judicial_notice_the_law_on.html (last
visited Mar. 31, 2016) (comparing privacy under Pennsylvania Wiretap Act to Federal
Wiretap Act). Some states, including Pennsylvania, also allow for one-party consent to record
telephone conversations. See id.
34. See Commonwealth v. Diego, 119 A.3d 370, 380–81 (Pa. Super. Ct.) (providing
court’s analysis of whether police actions constituted interception), appeal denied, 129 A.3d
1240 (Pa. 2015) (mem.) (unpublished table decision).
35. See 18 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 5704(2)(ii)–(iii) (providing exceptions to
requirement to obtain warrant for interception). See generally Commonwealth v. Cruttenden,
58 A.3d 95, 95–96 (Pa. 2012) (holding officer directly engaging in conversation is not
intercepting for purposes of statute); Proetto, 771 A.2d at 832 (holding no interception
occurred when police officer interacted directly with defendant in online chat room); see also
What are Pennsylvania’s wiretapping laws?, supra note 33.
36. See generally 18 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 5702 (defining intercept); see also
Diego, 119 A.3d at 380 (“The definition of ‘intercept’ . . . specifically excludes ‘the
acquisition of the contents of a communication made through any electronic, mechanical or
other device or telephone instrument to an investigative or law enforcement officer . . . .”).
37. See Karoly v. Mancuso, 65 A.3d 301, 303 (Pa. 2013) (noting that statute prohibits
interception of private communications “except pursuant to specified procedures”). In
Karoly, the court addressed the issue of whether certain conversations made from jail could be
accessed without violating the Wiretap Act. See id. at 305. The court provided that the
Pennsylvania Wiretap Act does “allow county correctional facilities to monitor and record
inmate phone calls without any specific prior authorization, so long as inmates are notified in
writing and anyone calling into the facility is also told that his call may be monitored and
recorded” and these recordings may only be turned over to authorities in order to “safeguard
the facility.” See id. at 303-04 (citing 18 PA. CONST. STAT. § 5704(14) (2015)). However, the
court clarified that attorney-client conversations are not subject to interception in order to
protect the legal privilege. See id. at 304.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984) (describing
proposition that there is no expectation of privacy when one reveals information to third
party). The Supreme Court noted that when one reveals information to a “confidant,” there is
a chance that person will turn over that information to the government, and the government
may use that information without violating the Fourth Amendment. See id.; see also United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (stating that when people reveal bank deposit slips
to others, they risk that information being shared with government).
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information one relays to others.39 While some commentators have postulated
that the Supreme Court held that individuals have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in text messages, the government maintains that lower courts still retain
broad power to determine this issue. 40
Courts exercising broad deferential power to analyze reasonable
expectation of privacy issues regarding text messages often rely on reasoning
similar to that of the Supreme Court in United States v. Jacobsen.41 In
Jacobsen, the defendants were arrested after the employees of “a private freight
carrier” opened a suspicious package and found a “white powdery substance.”42
The freight carrier then contacted personnel at the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) who determined that the substance was cocaine, obtained
a warrant, searched the location of the intended recipient, and arrested the
defendants.43 The trial court denied the motion to suppress the evidence, but the
court of appeals reversed, holding that testing the substance was an improper
expansion of the original search and a warrant was required. 44 In overruling the
court of appeals, the Supreme Court discussed the idea that when someone
reveals private information to another person, there is a risk that the information
will be shared with a third party or law enforcement, and the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit the government from using that information. 45

39. See, e.g., Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117 (noting that when privacy interest has already
been frustrated, authorities can use information without violating Fourth Amendment); see
also Vitale, supra note 18, at 1120 (discussing various exceptions to Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement). The misplaced trust doctrine is similar to the “third-party doctrine”
enunciated by the Katz court. See id.
40. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 757 (ruling search of text messages
reasonable, “even assuming Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy”); see also Vitale,
supra note 18, at 1110 (“The [Supreme] Court has given wide deference [] to lower courts in
deciding matters pertaining to cell phone privacy.”). Vitale argues that the Supreme Court’s
reluctance in Quon to decide “whether a text message sender had Fourth Amendment
protections in a context outside of the workplace” indicates the Court may consider
reexamining this issue and extend the letter analogy to “mobile communication in the twentyfirst century.” See id. at 1125.
41. 466 U.S. 109, 125-26 (1984) (holding warrantless “seizure” was reasonable when
privacy rights had already been infringed “as the result of private conduct”).
42. See id at 111–12 (discussing private search of shipped packages). During
shipment, the package was damaged. See id. When examining the damaged package, the
freight employees noticed a suspicious substance and notified the DEA. See id.
43. See id. (discussing search and arrest of defendants). The defendants were indicted
for possessing an illegal substance with intent to distribute. See id.
44. See id. (examining procedure of case). The court of appeals held that the DEA
agent’s warrant depended “on the validity of the agents’ warrantless test of the white powder,
that the testing constituted a significant expansion of the earlier private search, and that a
warrant was required.” Id. (footnote omitted).
45. See id. at 126 (holding expectation of privacy had “already been frustrated” enough
to eliminate constitutional protections); see also id. at 115–16 (noting that government action
may not “change the nature of the search” such that search becomes “additional search subject
to the warrant requirement” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Supreme Court found
that the DEA agent’s warrant was valid as the “initial invasions of [the defendants’] package
were occasioned by private action.” See id. at 115. The Court also found that, in order to
violate the defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights, the subsequent testing of the substance by
the DEA had to “exceed the scope of the private search.” See id.
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As technology has developed, courts have struggled to determine whether
an expectation of privacy is reasonable. 46 Many courts have compared
electronic messages to archaic forms of correspondence, such as written
letters.47 In Guest v. Leis,48 there was an investigation into the use of obscenity
on an online computer bulletin board.49 While the Sixth Circuit ruled for the
defendants on other grounds, the court noted that, like a letter, once the message
had been delivered to its intended recipient, the sender no longer had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in those messages.50
Many courts have been reluctant to view text messages as distinct and

46. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 149 Fed. App’x 954, 959–60 (11th Cir. 2005)
(analyzing expectation of privacy in text messages and e-mails as matter of first impression).
The court cited the subjective and objective prongs from Katz to determine whether a
reasonable expectation of privacy exists. Id. However, the court also pointed out the
existence of the third party exception. See id. The court further likened text messages to email messages, finding, “[t]he transmitter of an e-mail message enjoys a reasonable
expectation that police officials will not intercept the transmission without probable cause and
a search warrant. However, once the transmissions are received by another person, the
transmitter no longer controls its destiny.” Id. at 959 (quoting United States v. Maxwell, 45
M.J. 406, 418 (U.S.A.F. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
47. See id. (“Those circuits that have addressed the question have compared e-mails
with letters sent by postal mail.”); see also Vitale, supra note 18, at 1123–24 (discussing
difficulty with analogizing text messages to letters). Vitale argues that the letter analogy is
“insufficient and logically inconsistent.” See id. (quoting Katharine M. O’Connor, Note, :o
OMG They Searched My Txts: Unraveling the Search and Seizure of Text Messages, 2010 U.
ILL. L. REV. 685, 686) (internal quotation marks omitted).
First, text messages are transmitted in a matter of seconds, while letters are
delivered in a matter of days. Consequently, “any reasonable expectation of
privacy that existed is obliterated just as quickly as the message is delivered.” . . .
Finally, as technology evolves, courts should consider not only the sophistication of
the technology but also the way in which people relate to and interact with the
technology.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Even though courts have analogized text messages and letters, letter
senders have some privacies that are not enjoyed by text message senders, such as the law
making it a federal offense to open a letter addressed to someone else. See id. at 1124–25.
48. 255 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2001).
49. See id. at 330-32 (discussing facts of case). The system in which the obscenities
were found included “thousands of subscribers from the Greater Cincinnati area, the United
States and even overseas.” See id. at 330 (internal quotation marks omitted). Users of the site
could send e-mails to other subscribers as well as participate in “chat room conversations, online games, and conferences.” See id. Officers from the Hamilton County, Ohio, Regional
Electronic Computer Intelligence Task Force (RECI) often would download obscene images
and present them to a court in order to obtain a warrant. See id. The offenses in question
included pandering obscenity, which violated an Ohio statute. See id. When the officers
executed the warrant, they were unable to obtain just the obscene images from the computer,
so they dismantled the computer and removed it from the house. See id. at 330–31. One of
the issues the court decided was whether this action exceeded the scope of the warrant. See
id. at 332.
50. See id. at 333 (citing United States v. King, 55 F.3d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir. 1995))
(analogizing e-mailers to letter-writers). “They would lose a legitimate expectation of privacy
in an e-mail that had already reached its recipient; at this moment, the e-mailer would be
analogous to a letter-writer, whose ‘expectation of privacy ordinarily terminates upon
delivery’ of the letter.” Id. (quoting King, 55 F.3d at 1196).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017

9

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 6 [2017], Art. 2

20

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW: TOLLE LEGE [Vol. 61: p. 11

continue to analogize them to older means of communication. 51 However, in
State v. Patino,52 the Rhode Island Supreme Court focused specifically on the
issue of privacy in text messages as an issue of first impression for Rhode
Island.53 The most common context in which this question arises occurs when
law enforcement search a suspect’s own cell phone incident to arrest.54 In
Patino, however, the court reviewed the issue of whether text messages stored
in another’s phone are subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy. 55 The
defendant was indicted for first-degree murder of his girlfriend’s six-year old
son; the prosecution was mostly premised on incriminating text messages sent
by the defendant and discovered on his girlfriend’s cell phone. 56
In analyzing whether the evidence obtained should have been suppressed
for illegal search and seizure, the court looked to approaches taken by other
jurisdictions to determine whether one has a reasonable expectation of privacy
in text messages stored in another’s phone. 57 While the court acknowledged
51. See State v. Patino, 93 A.3d 40, 54 (R.I. 2014) (noting hesitancy to adapt to new
technology, stating “[i]t is often not easy to pour new wine into old wineskins, yet wise
stewardship might suggest the use of the old skins until they burst”), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
947 (2015) (mem.); see also Jones, 149 Fed. App’x at 959 (noting defendant had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages stored in another’s phone). The Jones
court discussed Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz. See id. By analogizing text messages to
letters and e-mails, in which privacy interests erode upon delivery, the court grouped text
messages with other forms of technology, and accepted those cases as precedent. See id.
52. 93 A.3d 40 (R.I. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 947 (2015) (mem.).
53. See id. at 55 (noting issue is of first impression).
54. See generally Sara M. Corradi, Comment, Be Reasonable! Limit Warrantless Smart
Phone Searches to Gant’s Justification for Searches Incident to Arrest, 63 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 943, 944–54 (2013) (examining standard for lawful search of smart phones incident to
arrest). The author analyzes lower courts’ analyses of warrantless cellphone searches. See id.
at 948–52. Corradi refers to a Fifth Circuit decision that compared a cell phone to a closed
container that may be searched incident to arrest. See id. at 948. She also discusses a Fourth
Circuit decision that held that, incident to arrest, text messages may be searched without a
warrant and recorded in order to preserve the information in United States v. Young. See id. at
949.
55. See Patino, 93 A.3d at 54–58 (discussing issue in case).
56. See id. at 42 (summarizing facts of case). While investigating the crime scene, the
police officer searched a cell phone after it received a text message. See id. at 44–45. He
noticed the phone on the counter and one “indicated audibly and by light that it was receiving
a message.” Id. at 44 (internal quotation marks omitted). The police officer picked up the
phone to see if it was the victim’s father or someone else calling to inquire about the victim’s
condition. See id. Seeing there was a new message, the officer “‘manipulated the button’ on
the phone, which led to a mailbox listing incoming and outgoing text messages. [The officer]
testified that, upon seeing the word ‘hospital’ in a text message,” he opened the folder and
read a message that referred to the child’s injuries. Id. The officer testified that he did not
read any more messages, but he did relay the information from that message to another
officer. See id. At one point, the officer noticed that a phone was missing, and contacted
headquarters notifying them that, “[t]here is possibly some information that needs to be
protected on it . . . .” See id. (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Another officer was able to obtain a warrant, which allowed the officers to find further text
messages that ultimately incriminated the defendant. See id. at 44–45.
57. See id. at 52–53 (discussing how U.S. Supreme Court has determined
reasonableness for other cases). The Patino court cited to a Supreme Court concurrence,
which pointed out that “‘[T]echnology can change those expectations [of privacy]. Dramatic
technological change may lead to periods in which popular expectations are in flux and may
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that advances in technology could lead to different results, its analysis
ultimately turned on whether the defendant owned or was the primary user of
the cell phone.58 The court determined that the location of the seized text
messages is the most important factor in finding an expectation of privacy and
that the sender loses control over the messages once they are sent.59
D. Software Update Available: Courts Adjust to New Technology and
Find Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Text Messages
In recent years, with the continued emergence of new technology, some
courts have recognized the need to modify the old rules, particularly regarding
text messages.60 In City of Ontario v. Quon,61 the United States Supreme Court
had the opportunity to determine whether text messages stored in another’s
device were subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy, but the Court did not

ultimately produce significant changes in popular attitudes.’” Id. at 52 (alterations in original)
(quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring)). Further,
the Supreme Court has acknowledged that “‘[r]apid changes in the dynamics of
communication and information transmission are evident not just in the technology itself but
in what society accepts as proper behavior[.]’” Id. at 52–53 (alteration in original) (quoting
City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 748 (2010)); see also id. at 55 (noting that courts have
often compared text messages to other forms of communication, such as personal computers,
e-mails, address books and laptops).
58. See id. at 55. The Fifth Circuit in Finley held that “the defendant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in [the defendant’s] cell phone because . . . he ‘maintained a property
interest in the phone, [and] had a right to exclude others from using the phone[.]’” Id. (third
alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259 (5th Cir. 2007)).
59. See id. at 55–56 (noting that “idea of control has been central” to court’s
determinations under Fourth Amendment). The Patino court also noted that the United States
Supreme Court considered control as a factor in reviewing the expectation of privacy in an
item when determining the “distinction ‘between the Fourth Amendment rights of passengers
and the rights of an individual who has exclusive control of an automobile” in Rakas v.
Illinois. See id. at 56 (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 154 (1978)). For other cases
considering control as a factor, see United States v. Davis, 787 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (D. Or.
2011) (noting reasonable expectation of privacy in contents of one’s own phone); State v.
Boyd, 992 A.2d 1071, 1081 (Conn. 2010) (finding reasonable expectation of privacy over
phone because it would have been reasonable for trial court to conclude defendant “exercised
exclusive control over it”); State v. Bone, 107 So. 3d 49, 66 (La. Ct. App. 2012) (finding
reasonable expectation of privacy when one “ha[s] a possessory interest in the phone as the
exclusive user”).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Lucas, 640 F.3d 168, 178 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[A]nalogizing
computers to other physical objects when applying Fourth Amendment law is not an exact fit
because computers hold so much personal and sensitive information touching on many private
aspects of life.”); see also Corradi, supra note 54, at 958–59 (noting that courts have found
that “computers have a heightened expectation of privacy and require police to obtain a
specific warrant for the computer prior to searching its contents”); Bryan Andrew Stillwagon,
Note, Bringing an End to Warrantless Cell Phone Searches, 42 GA. L. REV. 1165, 1200–01
(2008) (arguing that cell phones are comparable to computers). Stillwagon argues that,
because cell phones have the ability to contain as much information as a computer, cellphones
should be classified as computers. See Stillwagon, supra, at 1201. The author bases this
argument on the possibility that “a look into a cell phone’s memory can reveal a subjective
picture of our life.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
61. 560 U.S. 746 (2010).
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rule on that issue.62 In Quon, an employee’s government-provided pager was
searched after he violated the terms of use by sending and receiving too many
messages.63 While the Supreme Court did not address whether an individual
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages stored on another
person’s device, the Court determined that the defendant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in messages sent from his pager. 64 In finding for the
City, the Supreme Court held that although there was an expectation of privacy
in the text messages, the City’s search was nonetheless reasonable because it
fell under the “special needs of the workplace” exception. 65 Further, in dicta,
the Court acknowledged that “cell phone and text message communications are
so pervasive that some persons may consider them to be essential means or
necessary instruments for self-expression, even self-identification.”66
In recent years, courts have sought to expand the Fourth Amendment to
keep pace with changing technology.67 The Supreme Court recently decided
such an issue in Riley v. California.68 In Riley, police obtained data stored on a
drive-by shooting suspect’s cell phone without a warrant.69 The defendant
moved to suppress the evidence against him, and the Supreme Court held that
the police generally may not search a cell phone seized from an individual upon
arrest without first obtaining a warrant. 70 The Court noted that “[m]odern cell
phones are not just another technological convenience. . . . [T]hey hold for

62. See id. at 765 (noting it is not necessary to decide issue in this case).
63. See id. at 750–52 (discussing facts of case). The City of Ontario Police Department
provided pagers to its employees. See id. at 750–51. In using the pagers, the employees had
to abide by a “Computer Usage, Internet and E–Mail Policy” which gave the City “the right to
monitor and log all network activity including e-mail and Internet use.” Id. at 751 (internal
quotation marks omitted). When Quon exceeded his limit multiple times, his superior audited
his messages and revealed most messages were not related to work. See id. at 751–53.
64. See id. at 760 (assuming Quon had reasonable expectation of privacy in messages
sent by him on his pager).
65. See id. at 760–61 (quoting O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987) (plurality
opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting “the ‘special needs’ of the workplace”
trumps unreasonable warrantless searches). The Court found that “clearly communicated”
employer policies can “shape” employees’ reasonable expectations. See id. at 760.
66. See id. at 760 (noting that pervasiveness of cell phones may “strengthen” case for
expectation of privacy); see also Vitale, supra note 18, at 1110 n.3 (noting courts have relied
on this language to find broad expectation of privacy).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 285 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he
Fourth Amendment must keep pace with the inexorable march of technological progress, or its
guarantees will wither and perish.”); see also Soma et al., supra note 21, at 526–28
(discussing legal approaches to privacy issue). Soma and his co-authors argue that “[t]he right
to privacy should not be limited to any particular medium or form of expression.” Id. at 526
(quoting Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
205–06 (1890)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
68. 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (“These cases require us to decide how the search
incident to arrest doctrine applies to modern cell phones . . . .”).
69. See id. at 2480–81 (discussing facts of case). Incident to arrest, police seized a cell
phone from the subject and searched its contents, finding photographs and videos that proved
the defendant was involved in a gang. See id.
70. See id. at 2485 (holding that warrants are required to search “data on cell phones”).
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many Americans ‘the privacies of life.’” 71
The Washington State Supreme Court recently addressed this expansive
view of cell phone privacy in State v. Hinton.72 In Hinton, a detective arrested a
man for possession of heroin and seized his cell phone in the process.73 The
detective then responded to an incoming text message on the man’s cell phone
and set up a drug deal.74 The detective subsequently arrested the defendant. 75
The court ruled for the defendant and found that the text message conversation
was private and that the detective was required to obtain a warrant before
seizing such information.76 Despite no longer having physical control over his
text messages, the court thought the defendant was still entitled to a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the messages he sent. 77 The Washington Supreme
Court recognized the need to respond to the emergence of new technology and
acknowledged that, while legislatures and courts must strike a balance between
fighting crime and privacy, ease of communication should not erode privacy
interests.78
III.

PENNSYLVANIA SUPERIOR COURT REJECTS CALL TO UPDATE
PRIVACY ISSUES IN COMMONWEALTH V. DIEGO

In Commonwealth v. Diego, the Pennsylvania Superior Court refused to
consider modern uses of technology in deciding that individuals do not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in sending a text message. 79 The court read
the text of the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act narrowly and held that no interception
had occurred.80 In reaching its holding, the court avoided a deeper discussion of
the expectation of privacy in text messages and the loophole in the

71. See id. at 2494–95 (citation omitted) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
630 (1886)) (noting that before seizing cell phone police should get warrant).
72. 319 P.3d 9, 16 (Wash. 2014) (en banc) (acknowledging increased use of text
messages to discuss private matters).
73. See id. at 11 (discussing facts of case). The court analyzed “whether a text
message conversation was ‘a private affair[]’ protected from a warrantless search” under the
Washington Constitution. Id. (alteration in original).
74. See id. (discussing facts).
75. See id. (discussing facts).
76. See id. (noting holding of case). The Washington Supreme Court looked to the
state’s historical treatment of phone calls and other electronic communications to determine
that text messages are subject to an expectation of privacy. See id. at 14.
77. See id. at 14–15 (rejecting notion that control determines whether messages are
private). The Washington Supreme Court decided this case based on its state constitution,
rather than the Fourth Amendment. See id. (“Given the realities of modern life, the mere fact
that an individual shares information with another party and does not control the area from
which that information is accessed does not place it outside the realm of [the Washington
Constitution’s] protection.”).
78. See id. at 14 (acknowledging that Washington law favors privacy over needs of law
enforcement); see also Soma et al., supra note 21, at 504 (discussing growing expectation of
privacy in e-messaging).
79. For a thorough discussion of the Diego decision regarding a reasonable expectation
of privacy, see infra notes 96–112 and accompanying text.
80. For a discussion of the superior court’s reasoning regarding the Pennsylvania
Wiretap Act, see infra notes 113–25 and accompanying text.
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Pennsylvania Wiretap Act.81
A. Siri, Please Tell Me the Facts of Commonwealth v. Diego
After determining that Mr. Gary Still had been involved in a firearms theft,
Detective James Moyer (the detective) apprehended Still at Still’s father’s
residence.82 The detective read Still his Miranda rights, and Still soon admitted
to stealing the firearms, which he later used to trade for heroin. 83 After learning
this, the detective asked Still to set up a heroin deal, and police officers told him
“it would be in his best interest to do so.”84 Still agreed and explained that he
would “use the text messaging service on his iPad” to communicate with
Diego.85 During the transaction, Still texted Diego from his iPad and relayed
each message to the detectives.86 Still scheduled the transaction to take place at
a local hotel, and police officers were able to arrest Diego. 87
Following his arrest, Diego filed a motion to suppress the evidence used

81. For a discussion of the superior court’s rejection of the Appellant’s Brief, see infra
notes 116–25 and accompanying text.
82. See Commonwealth v. Diego, 119 A.3d 370, 372–73 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015)
(describing police investigation of Mr. Gary Still), appeal denied, 129 A.3d 1240 (Pa. 2015)
(mem.) (unpublished table decision). According to the factual summary of the trial court, the
detective “determined that Mr. Still was involved in the theft of approximately twelve (12)
firearms from the residence . . . .” Id.
83. See id. (describing Still’s confessions). Still admitted to stealing numerous guns
over eight weeks, two of which he exchanged for heroin with Diego. See id. Still organized
the transactions with his iPad, which the police previously confiscated during the firearms
negotiation. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id. (describing Still’s transaction with Diego). Still sat with at least six
detectives in the basement of the police station and relayed each response from Diego to the
detectives. See id. Detective Moyer testified that an officer was sitting next to Still and “it
was possible that the officer observed what Mr. Still was doing on the iPad.” See id. at 372–
73. The trial court found that:
“[d]uring the communication, officers were in the room contemporaneously
observing and directing, but not themselves doing the communicating. . . . The
officers[’] giving direction to Still, and watching over him, amounts to
eavesdropping or listening in on the electronic message communication.” The
court also noted that “it was [Still] who initiated the phone call at the direction of
the officers; the clear intent was to intercept.”
Id. at 381 n.2 (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Diego,
No. 22–CR–0001203–2013 (C.P. Dauphin Mar. 16, 2015)). While the suppression court
relied on this information to suppress the evidence obtained, the detective rejected this
description of the facts:
We asked Mr. Still if he would be willing to set up a deal with his dealer that
evening, which he agreed to do. From that point, he said he usually contacts
[Appellee] with an i[P]ad through a text messaging service on his i[P]ad. He was
provided his i[P]ad. He then set up the deal. He asked what he should do. I said,
[j]ust do your deal the way you normally would. He set it up. He relayed to me
what was going on. The deal was set up.
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Transcript of Proceedings, Suppression Hearing - Vol. 1,
at 7, Commonwealth v. Diego (C.P. Dauphin Jan. 31, 2014), No. 22–CR–0001203–2013).
87. See id. at 373 (describing transaction and Diego’s subsequent arrest).
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against him.88 At the hearing, “the trial court requested that the parties brief the
suppression-related issues[,]” and on October 28, 2014, the court granted
Diego’s suppression motion. 89 Consequently, the Commonwealth appealed to
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.90
B. Renewing Two-Year Contract: The Superior Court Maintains the
Status Quo in Its Diego Analysis
In holding for the Commonwealth, the Pennsylvania Superior Court
addressed three separate issues, eventually overturning the trial court opinion
and finding that the text messages need not be suppressed. 91 The court held that
the appellee’s iPad was not a “device” as defined in the Pennsylvania Wiretap
Act, that Diego lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in his text message
communications, and that the trial court erred in granting Diego’s motion to
suppress evidence because Diego’s text messages were not “intercepted” in
violation of the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act.92
1.

A New Model: An iPad Is Not a Device

The court first discussed whether Diego’s iPad fell under the Pennsylvania
Wiretap Act’s definition of device.93 Under the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act,
using what courts have termed the “telephone exemption,” a police officer may
use a telephone in the “ordinary course of his duties” to intercept a wire,
electronic, or oral communication.94 The court held that an iPad was an
“electronic, mechanical, or other device” and therefore did not fall under the
telephone exemption of the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act. 95
88. See id. (explaining Diego’s motion to suppress evidence). Diego argued that “[t]he
police supervised and observed the text-message conversation between Still and his drug
supplier as it was occurring on the iPad.” See id. at 381 n.2 (alteration in original) (quoting
Brief for Appellee at 3, Commonwealth v. Diego, 110 A.3d 370 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) (No.
1989 MDA 2014) [hereinafter Brief for Appellee], 2015 WL 5666844, at *3).
89. See id. at 373 (providing lower court’s holding).
90. See id. (referring to Commonwealth’s timely appeal).
91. See id. at 373 (indicating three issues to address on appeal and holding of court).
92. See id. at 375–76 (describing superior court’s holding).
93. See id. at 374 (framing issue).
94. See id. (citing 18 PA. STAT. § 5702 (1973)) (discussing telephone exemption under
Pennsylvania Wiretap Act). The Commonwealth argued that an iPad should fall under the
telephone exemption to the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act. See id. The Commonwealth sought to
rely on this exception by arguing that the iPad “was being used as the functional equivalent of
a modern cellular phone . . . .” See id.
95. See id. (holding iPad cannot be classified as telephone and therefore cannot be used
to intercept messages under telephone exemption to Pennsylvania Wiretap Act). The superior
court rejected the Commonwealth’s argument and refused to expand the definition of device
under the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act to include an iPad. See id. The court stated that Diego’s
iPad was not a device under the statute because it was not used to intercept a communication,
there was no evidence that Diego even used an iPad to communicate with Still, and Still’s
iPad was the “origin of the intercepted message, and not the device that purportedly
intercepted that message.” See id. Further, the court rejected the Commonwealth’s argument
that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania broadened the telephone exemption in
Commonwealth v. Spence, 91 A.3d 44 (Pa. 2014). See id. at 375. In Spence, a police officer
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2.

What’s Your Password? Court Finds No Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy in Sent Text Messages

Second, the superior court addressed whether one has “a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of [a] text message conversation . . . .”96
The court heavily relied on the earlier decision of Commonwealth v. Proetto,97
which considered the expectation of privacy in chat room conversations. 98 In
Proetto, the court held that one “savvy enough to be using the Internet” should
be aware that the messages sent could be downloaded and shared, and in
sending such a message, that person “expressly consents to the recording of the
message.”99 Relying on Proetto, the Commonwealth argued that Diego “lacked
a reasonable expectation of privacy” in his text message conversation. 100 Diego
disagreed with this argument and sought to distinguish text messages from chat
room conversations.101 In his brief, Diego explained that in a chat room
conversation, neither the sender nor any recipient of the messages can delete the
message once it is posted.102 He contrasted this by noting that the recipient of a

instructed an informant to make a phone call and turn on the speakerphone to allow the officer
to listen to the conversation. See id. While the defendant argued that the “phone was not a
phone under the Act with respect to the trooper” because the officer was not a subscriber to
that specific phone’s service plan, the court rejected this argument and held that the language
of the statute specifically exempts telephones from the definition of device, and does not
consider how the telephone is used. See id. (citing Spence, 91 A.3d at 47). In the present
case, the superior court held that an iPad is not a telephone under the “common understanding
of the relevant terms” and “[t]he fact that an iPad or any other tablet computer can perform
functions similar or identical to a modern cellular phone is not dispositive . . . .” See id.
Finally, the court also held it does not possess the power to broaden the interpretation of the
term “telephone” under the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act. See id. at 375–76.
96. See id. at 376 (stating second issue of case).
97. 771 A.2d 823 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001), appeal granted in part by 790 A.2d 988 (Pa.
2002) (mem.), and order aff’d by 837 A.2d 1163 (Pa. 2003) (mem.).
98. See Diego, 119 A.3d at 376 (quoting Proetto, 771 A.2d at 829) (discussing
expectation of privacy in e-mail or chat room conversations).
99. See id. at 376–77 (citing Proetto, 771 A.2d at 829) (finding lack of expectation of
privacy in Internet communications). In Proetto, the court first discussed the expectation of
privacy in telephone conversations and determined that while a person is engaging in a
telephone conversation, that person “would have no reason to believe that the other party was
taping the conversation.” See id. at 376 (quoting Proetto, 771 A.2d at 829). It then likened
sending an e-mail or chat room message to leaving a message on an answering machine. See
id. at 376–77 (quoting Proetto, 771 A.2d at 830).
The sender knows that by the nature of sending the communication a record of the
communication, including the substance of the communication, is made and can be
downloaded, printed, saved, or, in some cases, if not deleted by the receiver, will
remain on the receiver’s system. Accordingly, by the act of forwarding an e-mail
or communication via the Internet, the sender expressly consents by conduct to the
recording of the message.
Id. (quoting Proetto, 771 A.2d at 830).
100. See id. (presenting Commonwealth’s argument).
101. See id. at 377 (quoting Brief for Appellee, supra note 88, at 9–10) (arguing that
text message conversations and chat room conversations are inherently different).
102. See id. (asserting that chat room messages are not private because they cannot be
deleted and once sent, “the proverbial bell cannot be unrung” (quoting Brief for Appellee,
supra note 88, at 9-10)).
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text message can delete it, and the recipient of a text message is often a single
individual.103 Diego argued that these differences were dispositive, that a text
message should be distinguished from an Internet chat room message, and that
the Proetto decision should not apply.104 Additionally, Diego relied on the
Supreme Court’s Riley decision that held police may not search a smart phone
incident to arrest without obtaining a search warrant. 105
The Diego court rejected Diego’s argument and instead invoked Proetto,
noting that Proetto applied to both e-mails and chat room posts.106 The court
compared text messages to e-mails, saying that e-mails and text messages both
can be deleted by the recipient and both are often sent to only one recipient.107
The court also held that under the “mutual consent provision” of the
Pennsylvania Wiretap Act, Diego should have known that his message was
being recorded and could be shared.108 The court reasoned that because the
sender of a text message has knowledge that the message will be recorded, the
sender loses any reasonable expectation of privacy once that message is sent. 109
Further, the court rejected Diego’s reliance on Riley and found the
heightened expectation of privacy in text messages was not relevant to the facts
at bar.110 Unlike in Riley, the police in Diego did not search Diego’s phone
incident to arrest, so the heightened expectation of privacy was not
applicable.111 The court concluded its analysis of the expectation of privacy
issue by comparing text messages to e-mails and first-class mail, holding
“[w]hen an individual sends a text message, he or she should know that the

103. See id. (quoting Brief for Appellee, supra note 88, at 9-10) (contrasting chat room
conversations and text message conversations). Diego also argued that an Internet chat room
is “potentially populated by boundless, anonymous individuals,” and therefore chat room
discussions are inherently different from text messages. See id. (quoting Brief for Appellee,
supra note 88, at 9-10).
104. See id. (quoting Brief for Appellee, supra note 88, at 9-10) (distinguishing text
message from chat room post).
105. See id. at 377–78 (invoking Supreme Court decision in Riley v. California).
Diego argued that Riley granted a “heightened expectation of privacy” in cell phone usage.
See id. at 377.
106. See id. (referring to superior court’s inclusion of e-mails in its analysis in
Proetto).
107. See id. (finding that text messages and e-mails are substantially similar).
108. See id. (citing Commonwealth v. De Marco, 578 A.2d 942, 948 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1990)) (discussing why “answering machine tapes fall within the mutual consent provision of
the Wiretap Act”). The De Marco court held that a “reasonably intelligent person” leaving a
message on an answering machine “would have to be aware of, and consented by conduct to,
the recording of the message on the answering machine tape.” Id. (quoting De Marco, 578
A.2d at 948).
109. See id. (rejecting differences between chat rooms, e-mails, and text messages).
The court held that the idea of control and the “ability to delete” messages are irrelevant. See
id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, “[i]t is the sender’s knowledge that the
communication will automatically be recorded, surmised from the very nature of the selected
means of transmission, that is dispositive of the sender’s lack of an expectation of privacy or,
at least, the lack of any reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. (quoting De Marco, 578 A.2d
at 948).
110. See id. at 378 (rejecting Diego’s reliance on Riley).
111. See id. (distinguishing facts in Diego from those in Riley).
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recipient, and not the sender, controls the destiny of the content of that message
once it is received.”112
3.

Text Delivered: Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act

Finally, the court addressed the issue of whether an “interception” within
the statutory definition of the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act occurred.113 The
Commonwealth relied on two cases in which the courts determined, because the
law enforcement officers were direct parties to conversations, no interception
had occurred.114 Because there was “less police intrusion” in Diego than in
those two cases, the Commonwealth argued that no interception occurred. 115
The superior court rejected the Commonwealth’s argument because the
Pennsylvania Wiretap Act specifically exempts law enforcement officers who
communicate directly with a suspected defendant from violating the Act. 116
This did not occur in Diego, as the police officers were communicating with an
informant, and not directly with Diego, so the holdings from those cases did not
apply in Diego.117 Additionally, the court rebuked the Commonwealth for not
providing “support for the proposition that what is or is not an intercept under
the Wiretap Act turns on the magnitude of the ‘police intrusion.’” 118
The court nonetheless concluded that no interception occurred in the
case.119 The court found that Still spoke directly with Diego, and “voluntarily”
112. See id. (equating text message conversations to “first-class mail” (quoting
Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823, 831 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001)). The Proetto court
stated that a sender of a letter “can reasonably expect the contents to remain private and free
from the eyes of the police absent a search warrant founded upon probable cause,” but once
the intended recipient receives and opens the letter, there is no longer an expectation of
privacy. See id.
113. See id. at 379 (explaining that evidence may be suppressed for violations of
Pennsylvania Wiretap Act). In an earlier case, the superior court declared that even if an
interception does not violate one’s reasonable expectation of privacy, law enforcement can
still violate the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act by intercepting certain communications. See id.
(citing Commonwealth v. Deck, 954 A.2d 603, 608–09 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008)).
114. See id. at 379–80 (presenting facts of two cases where evidence was not
suppressed). The Commonwealth relied on a case where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that when a law enforcement officer “communicates directly with a suspect via cell
phone text messages while pretending to be the suspect’s accomplice[,]” no interception
occurs. Id. at 380 (alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cruttenden, 58 A.3d 95,
96 (Pa. 2012)). Additionally, the Commonwealth relied on Proetto, in which an officer posed
as an underage female in a chat room and communicated directly with the defendant. See id.
(citing Proetto, 771 A.2d at 832).
115. See id. at 380 (presenting Commonwealth’s argument that no interception
occurred).
116. See id. (discussing exemption for law enforcement officer communicating directly
with defendant).
117. See id. (rejecting Commonwealth’s reliance on Proetto and Cruttenden). Because
no law enforcement officer directly communicated with Diego in setting up a drug transaction,
the exemption did not apply. See id.
118. See id. (noting that no statute or relevant case law references police intrusion as
important to decision).
119. See id. (holding no interception occurred in violation of Pennsylvania Wiretap
Act).
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turned over the text messages to the police.120 The court held that no
interception occurred because once a message is received, the communication
has ended, and the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act does not govern any longer. 121
The court found relaying text messages to police after receiving them does not
“render either his or the police’s conduct an ‘interception’ . . . .”122
The court concluded its analysis by determining that an interception must
occur “during the transmission of the message, or at least simultaneous to the
receipt of the message,” which had not happened in Diego.123 While the court
acknowledged the situation might have been different had the police read the
text messages on Still’s iPad as he received them, the court concluded that was
not the case and thus did not rule on the matter.124 The superior court held the
trial court erred in suppressing the evidence because there was no constitutional
violation of Diego’s right to privacy, and the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act did not
apply to the circumstances.125
IV.

UPGRADE YOUR PLAN: DIEGO DEMONSTRATES THE NEED FOR A
CLOSER LOOK AT PRIVACY ISSUES AND LEGISLATION TO PROTECT
AGAINST INTRUSIVE WIRETAPS

In Diego, the Pennsylvania Superior Court joined a long list of courts that
have refused to adapt to new technology and broaden individuals’ expectation
of privacy.126 Pennsylvania courts have similarly refused to find an expectation

120. See id. at 380–81 (noting Still, and not police, was party to conversation).
121. See id. at 381 (declaring that once message is received, no interception can occur).
The court decided that, because Still “was a party to the conversation . . . he could not be said
to have intercepted [the message] simply because he received it.” Id. at 380–81.
122. See id. at 381 (interpreting Pennsylvania Wiretap Act). The court further opined
that
[o]nce an individual text message is received by the intended recipient, the
communication has ended. Once the communication had ended, it is simply
illogical to conclude that subsequent actions constitute intercepts within the
meaning of the Wiretap Act. . . . It would be absurd to conclude that anytime an
iPad or similar device records a text message conversation that a Wiretap Act
violation occurs—for that is the equivalent of saying that everyone receiving a text
message on such a device has committed a Wiretap Act violation.
Id.
123. See id. (holding no interception occurred).
124. See id. at 381–82 (noting that different facts may have led to different opinion).
The court noted that the record did not support Diego’s “assertion that the police were
watching Still’s iPad screen over his shoulder as the text messages were sent back and forth to
Appellee” but noted that if the police had observed the messages, “a different legal question”
would have to be decided “because it would then be plausible to argue that the police may
have observed the content of the text messages before Still had received them.” See id.
125. See id. at 382 (reversing suppression order and remanding case).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 126 (1984) (holding when one
reveals private information to another, that person assumes risks that information may be
shared with third party); United States v. Jones, 149 Fed. App’x 954, 959–60 (11th Cir. 2005)
(holding individual sending e-mail loses legitimate expectation of privacy after e-mail is
received by other party); State v. Patino, 93 A.3d 40, 57 (R.I. 2014) (holding sender of text
messages does not have reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages stored in cellular

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017

19

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 6 [2017], Art. 2

30

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW: TOLLE LEGE [Vol. 61: p. 11

of privacy in electronic messages.127 Analyzing cases similar to Diego,
Pennsylvania courts should adopt an approach similar to that taken by the
Washington State Supreme Court in Hinton.128 Further, Pennsylvania courts
should broadly interpret the most recent United States Supreme Court decisions
in Quon and Riley to protect more defendants in cases like Diego and find a
reasonable expectation of privacy in sent text messages.129 With the emergence
of new technology and the nearly universal use of texting, one should enjoy a
reasonable expectation of privacy when sending a text message. 130
Further, legislation may be necessary to address the loophole in the
Pennsylvania Wiretap Act, which allowed the law enforcement officers to direct
an informant to relay text messages from a suspected defendant without first
obtaining a court-ordered warrant.131 While providing law enforcement with
the tools to combat crime, the Pennsylvania legislature must uphold the privacy
rights of citizens of the Commonwealth. 132
telephone belonging to recipient of text messages), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 947 (2015)
(mem.).
127. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 832 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (holding
sender of e-mail or chat room messages has no expectation of privacy upon delivery to
recipient); Commonwealth v. De Marco, 578 A.2d 942 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (holding person
leaving message on answering machine has no expectation of privacy in that message).
128. 319 P.3d 9, 13 (Wash. 2014) (en banc) (holding police detective’s conduct in
reading text messages and responding invaded defendant’s “private affairs”).
129. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (recognizing heightened
expectation of privacy in text messages); City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010)
(noting it was assumed defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy in pager messages).
130. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 285 (6th Cir. 2010) (discussing
importance of Fourth Amendment keeping pace with technology); see also Soma et al., supra
note 21, at 525–26 (arguing telephone privacy protections should be extended to emessaging). Soma and his co-authors note that many courts have shown a willingness to find
a reasonable expectation of privacy in technology. See Soma et al., supra note 21, at 526
(describing courts’ feelings toward finding privacy expectation for technology). They argue,
“‘[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.’ In today’s world of cyberspace
communications, people must be identified with the various e-messaging communication
mechanisms they use.” Id. (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). They also argue Congress “intended . . . to extend
telephone privacy protections to other e-messaging forms, but the lack of clarity and
exceptions in that statute, along with varying interpretations by the courts, call for a return to
basic principles.” See id. (footnote omitted); see also Vitale, supra note 18, at 1137–38
(discussing why text messages should be subject to expectation of privacy). Vitale discusses
the expectation of privacy opined by the Katz doctrine and notes that the Supreme Court
“appears to have eliminated the subjective component of the Katz test.” See id. at 1136
(quoting Christopher R. Jones, “EyePhones”: A Fourth Amendment Inquiry into Mobile Iris
Scanning, 63 S.C. L. REV. 925, 935 (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore,
Vitale looks solely at whether the expectation of privacy over sent text messages is “shared by
society” and determines that, based on studies, “people consider their cell phones to be at least
as private of a device as a computer, if not more so.” See id. at 1136–37.
131. See Commonwealth v. Diego, 119 A.3d 370, 381–82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) (noting
outcome may have been different if officers observed messages over informant’s shoulder),
appeal denied, 129 A.3d 1240 (Pa. 2015) (mem.) (unpublished table decision); see also
Nelson, supra note 22 (discussing fact that situation could have been different with “one
officer glanc[ing] at the iPad screen”).
132. See Commonwealth v. Spangler, 809 A.2d 234, 236 (Pa. 2002) (noting Wiretap
Act emphasizes privacy and provisions are “strictly construed”); see also State v. Hinton, 319
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A. Pennsylvania Courts Must Issue New Privacy Policy and Disclosure
Statement Relating to Text Messages
In analyzing whether individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in sent text messages, the Pennsylvania Superior Court failed to distinguish text
messages from other forms of communication. 133 Holding that the sender of a
text message (or chat room message or e-mail) knows the message will
automatically be recorded fails to take into account the abundance of personal
information shared via these recorded forms of communication. 134
In recent years, many have noted that it is necessary for future courts to
address the modern realities of privacy situations and begin to grant a greater
expectation of privacy.135 Rather than trying to analogize text messages with
older means of communication for privacy analyses, courts in Pennsylvania
should address text messages as their own entity. 136 To make this shift, courts
should begin to follow the reasoning of the Washington State Supreme Court in
Hinton.137 Despite text messages being “more vulnerable to invasion,” the
privacy interests in them should not vanish. 138 Instead, with advances in
technology and greater surveillance, courts should begin to develop an approach
P.3d 9, 14 (explaining privacy rights overshadow needs of law enforcement in Washington),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 947 (2015) (mem.).
133. See Diego, 119 A.3d at 377 (comparing text messages to e-mails).
134. See Warshak, 631 F.3d at 284 (discussing importance of privacy in e-mails). The
Warshak court used the second prong of the Katz test to determine whether society would find
a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mails, noting the importance of the question given the
wide usage of email. Id. (“This question is one of grave import and enduring consequence,
given the prominent role that email has assumed in modern communication. . . . People are
now able to send sensitive and intimate information, instantaneously, to friends, family, and
colleagues half a world away. Lovers exchange sweet nothings, and businessmen swap
ambitious plans, all with the click of a mouse button.”).
135. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484–85 (2014) (noting
technological advances do not make information less private); City of Ontario, v. Quon, 560
U.S. 746, 760–61 (2010) (discussing that wide-spread use of cell phones may strengthen case
for privacy); Hinton, 319 P.3d at 15 (stating courts must acknowledge “realities of modern
life” in addressing privacy issues); see also Vitale, supra note 18, at 1138 & n.210–11
(pointing to divorce litigation to show that people have expectation of privacy in text
messages). Vitale writes that divorce litigation includes many instances where “intimate text
messages” are at issue. See id. at 1138 (discussing privacy expectation through divorce
litigation). Practitioners have also cited a rise in text messages being used as evidence. See
id. Vitale argues that there is “an expectation [in] society that text messages are a safe mode
of communication for highly private affairs, even though such messages are often used as
evidence in litigation.” Id.
136. See Stillwagon, supra note 60, at 1202 (arguing courts should not force “analogies
between objects just to make their analysis simpler”). Stillwagon argues that the facts of each
case should factor into a court’s decision. See id. (advocating for courts to take facts into
consideration). Because cell phones contain “vast amounts of information” courts have to
address warrantless cell phone searches as different from other searches, such as searching a
container. See id. at 1200–01 (discussing wealth of information stored on cell phones).
137. See Hinton, 319 P.3d at 16 (finding reasonable expectation of privacy in text
messages stored on another’s phone).
138. See id. at 13 (“Text messages can encompass the same intimate subjects as phone
calls, sealed letters, and other traditional forms of communication that have historically been
strongly protected under Washington law.”).
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that protects privacy interests. 139
This broad approach should follow interpretations of the Supreme Court’s
Quon and Riley decisions.140 While the Court in Quon did not decide whether
individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a message they
knowingly send to someone else, lower courts have interpreted the dicta in
Quon to find an increasingly broad right to privacy in text messages. 141 It is a
natural progression that the expectation of privacy should be expanded to
encompass text messages sent and stored on another’s phone. 142 In Riley, the
Supreme Court acknowledged the need to expand privacy to cover text
messages when it said cell phones contain many of the “privacies of life.” 143
Even though people are able to carry this information in their hands, it does not
make it “any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought.” 144
139. See id. (discussing advances in surveillance technology). The Hinton court noted
that the state constitutional privacy protections are not analytically constrained or lessened
because people anticipate lesser levels of protection. See id.
140. See Vitale, supra note 18, at 1110 n.3 (noting lower courts interpreted Quon
holding to further encompass text messages). Vitale cites to a Missouri case, which held that
individuals have an expectation of privacy in text messages, to prove courts have relied on
Quon to find a reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages. See id. (citing State v.
Clampitt, 364 S.W.3d 605, 609–10 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012)).
141. See City of Ontario, v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 765 (2010) (“Petitioners and
respondents disagree whether a sender of a text message can have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a message he knowingly sends to someone’s employer-provided pager. It is not
necessary to resolve this question in order to dispose of the case, however.”). While the Court
did not address sent text messages (in discussing Quon’s expectation of privacy in his own
text messages the Court essentially assumed such an expectation existed), lower courts have
relied on Quon to find a broad expectation of privacy in text messages. See, e.g., United
States v. Gomez, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1140 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (discussing Quon and noting
“[a]s the weight of authority agrees that accessing a cell phone’s call log or text message
folder is considered a ‘search’ for Fourth Amendment purposes, it would logically follow that
an individual also has a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to operational
functions, such as making calls or exchanging text messages.” (emphasis added)); United
States v. Davis, 787 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (D. Or. 2011) (discussing Quon and finding
reasonable expectation of privacy in person’s cell phone, including text messages); United
States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1299 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (“Cellular phones contain ‘a
wealth of private information’ such as recent-call lists, emails, text messages, and
photographs. An owner of a cell phone generally has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the electronic data stored on the phone. Thus, a search warrant is required to search the
contents of a cell phone unless an exception to the warrant requirement exists.” (citations
omitted) (quoting United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 577 (5th Cir. 2008)).
142. See Hinton, 319 P.3d at 13–14 (discussing evolution of privacy issues from
telegraphs, to phone calls, to electronic communications).
143. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494–95 (2014) (quoting Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing importance
of privacy interests).
144. See id. at 2495 (discussing in dicta importance of privacy in United States).
While discussing the Fourth Amendment and privacy, the Court refers to a 1761 James Otis
speech opposing the British officers’ “writs of assistance.” See id. at 2494 (discussing
reliance on Fourth Amendment by those in opposition to home searches during Colonial Era).
John Adams, present at the speech, proclaimed “Otis’s speech was ‘the first scene of the first
act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child
Independence was born.’” See id. (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625); see also Transcript: Read
the Full Text of the Primetime Republican Debate, supra note 2 (discussing importance of
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This language demonstrates that much of the foundation of the United States is
based in the rights of privacy, and Pennsylvania courts should be willing to use
this language to find a broader expectation of privacy in sent text messages. 145
While there are limited guidelines to follow, courts must attempt to
adapt.146 If courts continue to ignore and erode our expectations of privacy,
“the essence of human freedom [will be] severely crippled.” 147
B. Fixed Bug Causing App to Crash: Legislation Would Allow Law
Enforcement to Fight Crime While Recognizing Important Privacy
Interests
To provide texters with an expectation of privacy, the Pennsylvania
legislature will need to address the loophole in the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act
that allows police officers to access messages via an informant without first
obtaining a warrant.148 The Diego court noted there would have been “a
different legal question” had the police officers “observed the text message
conversation over Appellee’s shoulder as it occurred . . . .”149 This had not
privacy, candidate Rand Paul said, “The Fourth Amendment was what we fought the
Revolution over! John Adams said it was the spark that led to our war for
independence . . . .”).
145. See Stillwagon, supra note 60, at 1206 (arguing cell phones are unique and courts
should “recognize the nuances of modern cell phone technology”); see also Vitale, supra note
18, at 1144 (“Despite the continuing evolution of electronic communication, the Court cannot
ignore that text messaging has come to play a vital role in American society as a prevalent
way to convey private information.”).
146. See Vitale, supra note 18, at 1143–44 (noting future will bring new challenges
with new forms of communication).
147. See Greenwald, supra note 1 (criticizing notion that privacy is not important). In
his speech, Greenwald opposes “the idea that only people who are doing something wrong
have things to hide and therefore reasons to care about privacy . . . .” See id. Nevertheless, he
argues that those in power have “a much narrower conception of . . . ‘doing bad things.’ For
them, ‘doing bad things’ typically means doing something that poses meaningful challenges to
the exercise of our own power.” See id. Further, he says that failing to challenge constraints
does not make them “any less potent.” See id. (claiming that ignoring mass surveillance
“chains” does not make them weaker). Finally, he concludes by quoting activist Rosa
Luxemburg by saying, “He who does not move does not notice his chains.” See id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
148. See Nelson, supra note 22 (arguing fine line exists between interception and no
interception in Diego).
149. See Commonwealth v. Diego, 119 A.3d 370, 381–82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015)
(discussing whether outcome would be different with different facts), appeal denied, 129 A.3d
1240 (Pa. 2015) (mem.) (unpublished table decision). The Diego court found the assertion
from Diego—that the police officers were observing the text messages as they were sent to
Still’s phone—was not supported by the facts. See id. (asserting record does not support
Appellee’s assertion). In a footnote, the court provided the testimony of the detective as well
as the suppression court opinion and Diego’s brief and said that the suppression court never
definitively found that the officers observed the messages. See id. at 381 n.2. “Detective
Moyer testified that Officer Corey Dickerson was sitting next to Mr. Still during the
communications and said that it was possible that the officer observed what Mr. Still was
doing on the iPad.” Id. (quoting Transcript of Proceedings, Suppression Hearing - Vol. 3, at
1–2, Commonwealth v. Diego (C.P. Dauphin Mar. 16, 2015), No. 22–CR–0001203–2013
[hereinafter Transcript of Suppression Hearing]). The superior court, in dismissing this
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occurred, so no interception occurred in violation of the Pennsylvania Wiretap
Act.150
The fact that the actions taken by police did not constitute an interception
reveals a major flaw in the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act. 151 The court was correct
in dismissing the Commonwealth’s reliance on Proetto and Cruttenden and
arguing the amount of “police intrusion” determined whether an interception
occurred.152 However, by relying on the Commonwealth’s assertion that Still
“voluntarily” turned over the text messages ignores that law enforcement often
coerce informants into turning over messages under the threat of arrest. 153
When the police apprehended Still, Still was asked to set up a drug deal with
Diego, and the police told Still “it would be in his best interest to do so.” 154
Still had no choice but to comply with the officers’ demands. 155
Other courts addressing similar issues have held it should almost always be
a requirement for law enforcement to obtain a warrant to search someone’s
information.156 While the Diego court found that the police did not intercept
possibility, stated, “The mere possibility that Officer Dickerson had contemporaneously
observed the conversation between Appellee and Still on Still’s iPad does not demonstrate
that he did observe it. It merely expresses Detective[] Moyer’s uncertainty about what Officer
Dickerson observed.” Id.
150. See id. at 380 (holding no interception occurred). Because Still, and not the
police, spoke with Diego, the communication ended as soon as Still received the text message,
and therefore the police could not have intercepted it. See id. at 380–81.
151. See id. (discussing that no interception occurred because Still relayed text
messages to police).
152. See id. (rejecting Commonwealth’s argument). “The definition of ‘intercept’ in
Section 5702 specifically excludes ‘the acquisition of the contents of a communication . . .
between a person and an investigative or law enforcement officer, where the investigative or
law enforcement officer poses as an actual person who is the intended recipient of the
communication[.]’” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
5702). Based off this language, the court found that the exception to the definition of
intercept in the statute did not apply; nonetheless, the court held no interception occurred at
all. See id.
153. See id. (noting Still “voluntarily” relayed text messages to police). The court
found that Still spoke directly with the appellee by text message. See id. Further, the court
found that this conversation was voluntary. See id. Because Still was the one speaking with
Diego, “he could not be said to have intercepted it simply because he received it. That he
subsequently relayed the contents of that conversation to the police does not render either his
or the police’s conduct an ‘interception’ under the plain meaning of the Act.” See id. at 380–
81; see also Richard Q. Hark, Your IPAD and Text Communications . . . No Expectation of
Privacy . . . Sanctioned Police Conduct, HARK & HARK (July 23, 2015),
https://penncriminaldefense.wordpress.com/2015/07/23/your-ipad-and-text-communicationsno-expectation-of-privacy-sanctioned-police-conduct/ [https://perma.cc/9QCY-NLEG]
(criticizing result in Diego and noting police likely observed text messages).
154. See Diego, 119 A.3d at 372 (citing Transcript of Suppression Hearing, supra note
150, at 1–2) (explaining officers’ request that Still set up heroin deal with Diego).
155. See Your IPAD and Text Communications, supra note 153 (criticizing holding in
Diego). The author argues that “police participate in [criminal informant] real-time texting all
the time. . . . The [Diego] court ignored reality.” See id. (arguing that police should have been
required to secured warrant).
156. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) (“Our answer to the
question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is
accordingly simple—get a warrant.”); see also United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288
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Diego’s text messages, the police officers’ actions should be classified as an
interception and reviewed under the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act. 157 Although it
is important for law enforcement to maintain the ability to fight crime, privacy
issues cannot be ignored; therefore, the Pennsylvania legislature should enact an
amendment requiring law enforcement to obtain a warrant before enlisting an
informant to relay text messages.158
V.

CONCLUSION

As more and more courts find an increasingly broad expectation of privacy
in text messages, it is natural to assume a greater expectation of privacy in sent
text messages stored on another’s phone. 159 The Supreme Court has noted that
it is important to recognize the privacy rights in new forms of technology. 160 As
text messages contain the “privacies of life,” they should be afforded a
reasonable expectation of privacy from unwarranted government intrusion. 161
The Pennsylvania Wiretap Act needs to be amended to limit the ability of law

(6th Cir. 2010) (“The government may not compel a commercial ISP to turn over the contents
of a subscriber’s emails without first obtaining a warrant based on probable cause.”); State v.
Hinton, 319 P.3d 9, 16 (Wash. 2014) (en banc) (“Law enforcement is certainly permitted to
use some deception, but ‘[e]xperience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. . . . The greatest dangers to liberty
lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.’”)
(alterations in original) (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 947 (2015) (mem.).
157. See Nelson, supra note 22 (arguing Diego allows for easier warrantless searches).
Nelson writes, “For now, perhaps, the answer is, ‘don’t text with an informant,’ but this shifts
the focus to citizens to remain vigilant from government overreaching, rather than on the
government to uphold its obligations.” Id.
158. See Stillwagon, supra note 60, at 1205–06 (discussing purpose of Fourth
Amendment). However, the Fourth Amendment allows law enforcement officers to use
evidence. See id. (explaining use of evidence under Fourth Amendment). It just ensures that
a “neutral and detached magistrate” will make inferences about possible evidence, allowing
the law enforcement officer to legally fight crime. See id. at 1205–06 (quoting Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948)).
159. See Vitale, supra note 18, at 1144 (arguing new forms of electronic
communication will continue to develop). Vitale argues for a “uniform body of law
surrounding text messages” that will enable courts in the future to address text message
privacy without having to rely on tenuous analogies. See id. (emphasizing need for uniformity
in law concerning text messages and privacy).
160. See Warshak, 631 F.3d at 285 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34
(2001)) (discussing necessity of Fourth Amendment keeping pace with technology).
161. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494–95 (“Modern cell phones are not just another
technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many
Americans ‘the privacies of life.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 630 (1886)). The Court writes that because the Fourth Amendment is one of the
founding principles of the United States, it should only be circumvented by the use of
warrantless searches in limited “exigent circumstances.” See id. at 2494. Examples of this
would include “a suspect texting an accomplice who, it is feared, is preparing to detonate a
bomb, or a child abductor who may have information about the child’s location on his cell
phone.” See id. Nevertheless, because the Fourth Amendment is one of the founding
principles of the United States, it should only be circumvented in these rare situations. See id.
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enforcement to infringe on this right to privacy. 162 Until the Pennsylvania
courts acknowledge a right to privacy in sent text messages and until the
legislature amends the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act, residents of the
Commonwealth may need to abide by words of caution—Don’t Press Send.163

162. See Commonwealth v. Diego, 119 A.3d 370, 381–82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015)
(stating outcome of case may have been different with slightly different facts), appeal denied,
129 A.3d 1240 (Pa. 2015) (mem.) (unpublished table decision); see also Nelson, supra note
22 (arguing unclear law may lead to government overreach).
163. See Nelson, supra note 22 (warning not to text with informant).
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